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The optimal provision of a state-variable public good, where the global climate is the
prime example, is analyzed in a model where people care about their relative consump-
tion. We consider both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences (where people compare
their own current consumption with others’ current consumption) and catching-up-with-
the-Joneses preferences (where people compare their own current consumption with
others’ past consumption) in an economy with two productivity types, overlapping
generations, and optimal nonlinear income taxation. The extent to which the conventional
rules for provision of state-variable public goods (a dynamic analog of the Samuelson
rules) ought to be modified is shown to clearly depend on the strength of the relative
concerns of both kinds, but also on the preference elicitation format.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
How much should we spend to combat climate change? Naturally, the answer depends on many factors such as the links
between environmental damage and abatement investments, discounting issues, and on the nature of our preferences.
It also depends on how the funds for the investment are raised and on related second-best problems of the economy,
including how such investments interact with the use of other policy instruments. The present paper concerns the optimal
provision rule for a state-variable public good, such that the public good can be seen as a stock that changes over time, in a
dynamic economy where people have positional preferences for private consumption. The latter means that people derive
utility from their own private consumption relative to that of others – a notion with solid support in both questionnaire-
based experiments and happiness research.1
The problem of characterizing the optimal provision of public goods under relative consumption concerns is not new in
itself; it has been analyzed in a static setting with lump-sum taxes by Ng (1987), Brekke and Howarth (2002), and Aronsson
and Johansson-Stenman (2014a), and in a static setting with second best taxation by Wendner and Goulder (2008),
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2013a), and Wendner (2014). Howarth (1996, 2006) analyzed the related problem
of dealing with environmental externalities under relative consumption concerns.ier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
e (T. Aronsson), Olof.Johansson@economics.gu.se (O. Johansson-Stenman).
emenway (1998, 2005), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Stutzer
), Carlsson et al. (2007), Clark et al. (2008), Clark and Senik (2010), and Corazzini et al. (2012). See also
; Dohmen et al., 2011).
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variable, and where the concept of relative consumption lacks a time-dimension. To our knowledge, the optimal provision of
public goods under relative consumption concerns in a second-best economy has never been analyzed in a dynamic context,
although Brekke and Howarth (2002), Wendner (2003, 2005), and Howarth (2006) have examined the implications of
environmental externalities in dynamic models where relative consumption matters.2 There is also a sizable literature on
economic growth in models with relative consumption concerns (e.g., Konrad, 1992; Rauscher, 1997; Corneo and Jeanne,
1999; Brekke and Howarth, 2002; Abel, 2005; Wendner 2010a, 2010b). Since this dynamic public good provision problem
obviously is more complex than its static counterpart, one may wonder whether the value added in terms of insights from
such a study is worth the cost of additional complexity. We argue that it is for at least two reasons.
First, most public goods share important state-variable characteristics, in the sense that their quality depends on
previous actions, where the global climate stands out as a prime example. Indeed, the question concerning how much we
should invest to combat climate change is one of the most important and discussed of our times. The current quality, and
characteristics more generally, of the atmosphere are clearly not only affected by the actions taken today (such as current
public abatement activities); they are also strongly affected by actions taken in previous periods (cf. Stern, 2007).
Correspondingly, actions taken today will affect the atmosphere for a long time. Similar arguments apply to many other
public goods as well, including infrastructural investments such as roads, schools, and hospitals. It is therefore of high policy
relevance to identify optimal provision rules for state-variable public goods, and to understand how these rules are modified
due to relative consumption concerns, not least due to the important policy implications of such concerns found in other
literature on taxation and public expenditure. Given the dynamic nature of the policy problem analyzed below, the paper
will also, implicitly, touch on the discounting problem; yet, this is not the main task, and we will not discuss any
intergenerational equity issues.3
Second, the dynamic framework allows us to examine the implications of a broader set of measures of relative
consumption by considering comparisons based on keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences, where individuals compare
their current consumption with other people’s current consumption, simultaneously with intertemporal consumption
comparisons. Such intertemporal comparisons may include comparisons with one’s own past consumption as well as
comparisons with other people’s past consumption, where the latter will be referred to as catching-up-with-the-Joneses.4
The extension to intertemporal social comparisons is important for several reasons: (i) There is empirical evidence
suggesting that people make comparisons with their own past consumption and with the past consumption of others.5
(ii) Intertemporal social comparisons have been found to have important implications for optimal tax policy (Ljungqvist and
Uhlig, 2000; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2014b),6 and are also consistent with the equity premium puzzle discussed
in the literature on dynamic macroeconomics (e.g., Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). (iii) Finally, such comparisons
are also in line with recent research based on evolutionary models, such as Rayo and Becker (2007), in which there are
evolutionary reasons for why people should compare their own current consumption with three distinct reference points:
others’ current consumption, their own past consumption, and others’ past consumption. Our study relates to Rayo and
Becker in the sense that we consider all three comparisons simultaneously in terms of their implications for public good
provision. In addition to the value of identifying how the optimal public good provision rule should be modified due to these
extensions, we argue that it is equally important to identify the extent to which the basic insights from static models of
public good provision under relative consumption concerns carry over to the dynamic case with state-variable public goods.
While some of the results derived below are similar to those found in static models, others are distinctly different.
Policy rules for public goods depend on the set of tax instruments that the government has at its disposal. The model
in the present paper builds on the models developed in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010, 2014b), which address
optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in an Overlapping Generations (OLG) framework with two ability-
types but do not consider public goods, the concern of the present paper.7 Such a framework gives a reasonably realistic
description of the information constraints inherent in redistribution policy; it also allows us to capture redistributive
and corrective aspects of public good provision, as well as interaction effects between them, in a relatively simple way.2 Chapter 7 in the very rich book by Brekke and Howarth (2002) presents a model with stock externalities that has similarities with the model in the
present paper. Public goods are also briefly discussed in a dynamic context, but the model is very different otherwise and is based on a first-best setup.
3 The choice of discount rate is perhaps the most discussed issue in the economics of global warming; see, e.g., Nordhaus (2007), Stern (2007),
Weitzman (2009, 2010), and Milner (2013). See Johansson-Stenman and Sterner (2012) for an analysis of the optimal social discounting rule when relative
consumption matters.
4 Other literature sometimes uses the concepts of “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses” and “catching-up-with-the-Joneses” in a more specific way based on
assumptions about how the individual reacts to changes in others’ current and previous consumption; see, e.g., Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) and
Wendner (2010a, 2010b).
5 See, e.g., Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) and Frank and Hutchens (1993) for evidence suggesting that people make comparisons with their own
past consumption. Senik (2009) presents further empirical evidence pointing at the importance of historical benchmarks. She finds that individual well-
being increases if the standard of living of the respondent’s household increases compared with an internal benchmark given by the household’s standard
of living 15 year ago, and if the individual has done better in life than his/her parents, ceteris paribus.
6 Other literature on optimal taxation under relative consumption concerns typically focuses on atemporal (keeping-up-with-the-Joneses)
comparisons; see, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Ireland (2001), and Dupor and Liu (2003).
7 The seminal paper on public good provision under optimal nonlinear income taxation is Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), whereas Boadway and Keen
(1993) was the first study dealing with this problem based on the self-selection approach to optimal taxation developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).
To our knowledge, Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) were the first to address the optimal provision of a state-variable public good under nonlinear taxation.
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optimization problems, while the section “Firm behavior” considers the optimization problems of firms. In the section
“The government’s optimization problem”, we describe the corresponding optimization problem facing the government. The
section “A general rule for public good provision when relative consumption matters” presents rather general expressions for
the optimal provision rule, which are valid for all kinds of social comparisons. Yet, while these results provide general insights
on the incentives for public provision under relative consumption concerns, they are not directly interpretable in terms of the
strength of such concerns. Therefore, the provision rules derived in the sections “Optimal provision rules with keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses preferences” and “Optimal provision of the public good under both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and
catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences” are expressed directly in terms of the degrees of positionality.
The section “Optimal provision rules with keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences” concerns the case where the
individual only compares his/her own current consumption with other people’s current consumption (keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses preferences); as such, it builds on the model by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) and extends it to
encompass public goods. The results here are shown to depend crucially on the preference elicitation format. If people’s
marginal willingness to pay for the public good is measured independently, i.e., without considering that other people also
have to pay for increased public provision, then relative consumption concerns typically (for reasonable parameter values)
work in the direction of increasing the optimal provision of the public good. However, this is not the case when a
referendum format is used, so that people are asked for their marginal willingness to pay conditional on that all people will
have to pay for increased public provision. Conditions are also presented for when a dynamic analog of the conventional
Samuelson (1954) rule applies.
The section “Optimal provision of the public good under both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-
Joneses preferences” considers the more general case with both keeping-up and catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences
simultaneously, i.e., where people derive utility from their own consumption relative to the current and past consumption of
others, as well as relative to their own past consumption; thus, the model extends the one in Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2014b) to encompass public goods. Under some further simplifying assumptions (e.g., about the population size
and how the concerns for relative consumption change over time), it is shown that the policy rule for public provision can
be written as a straightforward extension of the corresponding policy rule derived solely on the basis of keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses preferences in the section “Optimal provision rules with keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences”. However,
contrary to the findings in the section “Optimal provision rules with keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences”, we also
show that if individuals compare their own consumption with other people’s past consumption, a referendum format for
measuring marginal benefits conditional on that others also have to pay for the public good no longer leads to a
straightforward dynamic analog to the Samuelson condition. The section “Conclusion” provides some concluding remarks.
Proofs of all propositions (along with some other calculations) are provided in the Appendix.The OLG economy and individual preferences
We consider an economy where individuals live for two periods. An individual of generation t is young in period t and old
in period tþ1. We assume that each individual works during the first period of life and does not work during the second.
Individuals differ in ability (productivity) and we simplify by considering a framework with two ability types, where the
low-ability type (type 1) is less productive than the high-ability type (type 2). Each individual of ability-type i and
generation t cares about his/her consumption when young and when old, cit and x
i
tþ1; his/her leisure when young, z
i
t; and
the amount of the public good available (which can be interpreted as the quality of the climate) when young and when old,
Gt and Gtþ1. The individual also derives utility through his/her relative consumption by comparison with (a) other people’s
current consumption, (b) his/her own past consumption, and (c) other people’s past consumption. This is soon to be
explained more thoroughly.
The lifetime utility function faced by ability-type i of generation t is written as follows:
Uit ¼ Vitðcit ; zit ; xitþ1; citct ; xitþ1ctþ1; xitþ1cit ; citct1; xitþ1ct ;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ
¼ vitðcit ; zit ; xitþ1; citct ; xitþ1ctþ1; citct1; xitþ1ct ;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ
¼ uitðcit ; zit ; xitþ1; ct1; ct ; ctþ1;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ; ð1Þ
where ct ¼∑i½nitcitþnit1xit =∑i½nitþnit1 ¼∑i½nitcitþnit1xit =Nt denotes the average consumption in the economy as a whole
in period t; nit measures the number of young individuals of ability-type i in period t (implying, of course, that n
i
t1
represents the number of old individuals of ability-type i in period t) and Nt ∑i½nit1þnit  denotes the total population in
period t. The five consumption differences in Eq. (1) – as represented by the fourth to eights argument in the function ViðU Þ
– are measures of relative consumption, and imply that the individual compares his/her current consumption with (a) the
current average consumption when young and when old, i.e., citct and xitþ1ctþ1; (b) his/her own consumption one
period earlier when old, i.e., xitþ1cit; and (c) the average consumption one period earlier when young and when old, i.e.,
citct1 and xitþ1ct . Two things are worth noting. First, the relative consumption is defined as the difference between the
individual’s own consumption and the appropriate reference measure; this approach is technically convenient and has been
used in many previous studies (e.g., Akerlof, 1997; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Bowles and Park,
T. Aronsson, O. Johansson-Stenman / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 68 (2014) 390–410 3932005; Carlsson et al.; 2007).8 Second, the measures of reference consumption implicit in comparisons (a) and (c) are
indicators of the average consumption in the economy as a whole, which is the common way to define reference
consumption in earlier studies.9
To explain the second utility formulation in Eq. (1), i.e., vitðUÞ, note that cit and xitþ1 are decision variables of the
individual; therefore, we can without loss of generality use the simpler function vitðUÞ on the second line, where the effect of
xitþ1cit on utility is embedded in the effects of cit and xitþ1. As such, habit formation does not produce a corrective motive
for provision of public goods. The function uitðUÞ is a convenient reduced form to be used in some of the calculations
presented below; however, uitðUÞ also represents the most general utility formulation in the sense of not specifying how the
relative consumption comparisons are made (other than that others’ consumption gives rise to negative externalities).
The policy rules for public provision examined below reflect the extent to which relative consumption concerns are
important for individual well-being. As such, it is useful to measure the degree to which such concerns matter for each
individual, which we will do by employing the second utility formulation, vitðU Þ, in Eq. (1). By using the variables
Δi;ct  citct ;Δi;xtþ1  xitþ1ctþ1; δi;ct  citct1; and δi;xtþ1  xitþ1ct
as short notations for the four differences in the function vitðUÞ, we follow Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014b) and
define the degree of current consumption positionality for ability-type i of generation t when young and old, respectively, as
αi;ct 
vit;Δc
vit;Δc þvit;δc þvit;c
; ð2Þ
αi;xtþ1 
vit;Δx
vit;Δx þvit;δx þvit;x
; ð3Þ
while we define the degree of intertemporal consumption positionality when young and when old, respectively, as
βi;ct 
vit;δc
vit;Δc þvit;δc þvit;c
; ð4Þ
βi;xtþ1 
vit;δx
vit;Δx þvit;δx þvit;x
: ð5Þ
Here, sub-indexes indicate partial derivative, i.e., vit;c  ∂vitðU Þ=∂cit , vit;x  ∂vitðU Þ=∂xitþ1, vit;Δc  ∂vitðUÞ=∂Δi;ct , vit;Δx  ∂vitðUÞ =∂Δi;xtþ1,
vit;δc  ∂vitðUÞ=∂δi;ct , and vit;δx  ∂vitðUÞ=∂δi;xtþ1.
Note that Eqs. (2) and (3) reflect comparisons with other people’s current consumption, i.e., the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses
motive for relative consumption. The variable αi;ct , which denotes the degree of current consumption positionality when young, is
interpretable as the fraction of the overall utility increase from an additional dollar spent on private consumption when young in
period t that is due to the increased consumption relative to the average consumption in period t. For example, if αi;ct ¼ 0:3, then
30% of the utility increase from the last dollar spent by the individual when young in period t is due to the increased relative
consumption compared with other people’s current consumption in the same period; hence, 70% is due to a combination of
increased absolute consumption and increased relative consumption compared with other people’s past consumption. The
variable αi;xtþ1 has an analogous interpretation for the old individual in period tþ1. Eqs. (4) and (5) reflect comparisons with other
people’s past consumption, i.e., the catching-up-with-the-Joneses motive for relative consumption. βi;ct denotes the fraction of the
overall utility increase from an additional dollar spent when young in period t that is due to the increased consumption relative
to other people’s past consumption; βi;xtþ1 has an analogous interpretation for the old consumer in period tþ1.
Returning finally to Eq. (1), the state-variable public good is governed by the difference equation
Gt ¼ gtþð1ξÞGt1; ð6Þ
where gt is the addition to the public good in period t, provided by the government, and 0rξr1 is the rate of depreciation.
Therefore, the traditional flow-variable public good appears as the special case where ξ¼ 1.
Each individual of any generation t treats the measures of reference consumption, i.e., ct1; ct and ctþ1, as exogenous
during optimization (while these measures are of course endogenous to the government, as will be explained below). Let lit8 An alternative is the (slightly less technically convenient) ratio comparison, where the individual’s relative consumption is defined by the ratio
between the individual’s own consumption and the reference measure (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; Wendner and Goulder,
2008). Mujcic and Frijters (2013) test models based on difference comparisons, ratio comparisons and ordinal rank without being able to discriminate
between them. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013b) derived optimal income taxation rules in a static model based on both difference and ratio
comparisons and concluded that the main qualitative insights obtained are unaffected by comparison type. The same applies here: although the choice to
focus on difference comparisons instead of ratio comparisons will affect the exact form of the policy rules derived below, it is of no significance for the
qualitative insights from our analysis.
9 Almost all previous studies on optimal tax and/or expenditure policy under relative consumption concerns assume that individuals compare their
own consumption with a measure of average consumption. In a study of optimal taxation, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) consider alternative
reference measures based on within-generation and upward comparisons, respectively, and find tax policy responses that are qualitatively similar to those
that follow if the reference point is based solely on the average consumption. Upward comparisons are also analyzed by Micheletto (2011).
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i
t savings,
and rt the market interest rate in period t. Also, let TtðU Þ and Φtþ1ðUÞ denote the payments of labor income and capital
income taxes in period t and tþ1, respectively. The individual budget constraint can then be written as
witl
i
tTtðwitlitÞsit ¼ cit ; ð7Þ
sitð1þrtþ1ÞΦtþ1ðsitrtþ1Þ ¼ xitþ1: ð8Þ
The individual first-order conditions for work hours and savings are standard. Since these conditions are not used to derive
the cost benefit rules for public goods analyzed below, they are presented in the Appendix.
Firm behavior
We model the production sector in a standard way: it consists of identical competitive firms, the number of which is
normalized to one for notational convenience, producing a homogenous good under constant returns to scale. This output is
used for both public and private consumptions, as described in the section “The government’s optimization problem”. The
production function is written as
Yt ¼ FðL1t ; L2t ;KtÞ; ð9Þ
where Yt denotes the output (national product), while Lit  nit lit is the total number of hours of work supplied by ability-type
i in period t, and Kt is the capital stock in period t. The representative firm obeys the standard optimality conditions
FLi ðL1t ; L2t ;KtÞ ¼wit for i¼ 1;2; ð10Þ
FK ðL1t ; L2t ;KtÞ ¼ rt : ð11Þ
To simplify the calculations below, we introduce an additional assumption, i.e., that the relative wage rate (often called
wage ratio) in period t, ϕt ¼w1t =w2t ¼ FL1=FL2 , does not depend directly on Kt , which holds for standard constant returns to
scale production functions such as the Cobb–Douglas and CES. This means that the intertemporal tradeoff faced by the
government will be driven solely by the interest rate.
The government’s optimization problem
We will use an as general social welfare function as possible by assuming that social welfare increases with the utility of
any individual type alive in any time period, without saying anything more regarding these relationships. Following
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010, 2014b), we then assume that the government faces a general social welfare
function as follows:
W ¼Wðn10U10;n20U20;n11U11;n21U21;…Þ; ð12Þ
which is increasing in each argument. Since ability is assumed to be private information, the public policy must also satisfy a
self-selection constraint. As in most of the literature on redistribution under asymmetric information, we consider a case
where the government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type, implying that the self-selection
constraint must prevent the high-ability type from acting as a mimicker, i.e.,
U2t ¼ u2t ðc2t ; z2t ; x2tþ1; ct1; ct ; ctþ1;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ
Zu2t ðc1t ;1ϕt l1t ; x1tþ1; ct1; ct ; ctþ1;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ ¼ U^
2
t : ð13Þ
The left-hand side of Eq. (13) denotes the utility of the high-ability type, while the right-hand side is the utility of the
mimicker (a high-ability type who pretends to be a low-ability type); the time endowment available for work hours and
leisure is normalized to one. The variable ϕt l
1
t is interpretable as the mimicker’s labor supply; since ϕt ¼w1t =w2t o1, we have
ϕt l
1
t o l
1
t . Note also that Eq. (13) is based on the assumption that all income is observable to the government.
The resource constraint for this economy means that the output is used for private consumption as well as private and
public investments, and is written as follows:10
FðL1t ; L2t ;KtÞþKt ∑
2
i ¼ 1
nitc
i
tþnit1xit
h i
Ktþ1gt ¼ 0: ð14Þ
The second-best problem will be formulated as a direct decision problem, i.e., to choose l1t , c
1
t , x
1
t , l
2
t , c
2
t , x
2
t , Kt , gt , and Gt
for all t to maximize the social welfare function presented in Eq. (12) subject to Eqs. (6), (13), and (14). The government also
recognizes that the measures of reference consumption are endogenous as defined by the mean-value formula presented in10 For notational simplicity, we do not explicitly model the depreciation of physical capital K. However, the change in the capital stock between time
periods can alternatively be interpreted as net investment, meaning that depreciation is accounted for implicitly.
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ℒ¼Wðn10U10;n20U20;n11U11;n21U21; ::::Þþ∑
t
λt ½U2t U^t
2
þ∑
t
γt FðL1t ; L2t ;KtÞþKt ∑
2
i ¼ 1
½nitcitþnit1xit Ktþ1gt
" #
;
þ∑
t
μt gtþð1ξÞGt1Gt
  ð15Þ
where λ, γ, and μ are Lagrange multipliers. The first-order conditions are presented in the Appendix. These conditions will
now be used to analyze the optimal provision of the public good.
A general rule for public good provision when relative consumption matters
In this section, we present general optimality conditions for the public good provision in a format that facilitates
straightforward economic interpretations and comparisons with the benchmark case with no relative consumption
concerns. More specifically, the optimal provision rules will be expressed in terms of what we will denote the positionality
effect, i.e., the welfare effect associated with changed reference consumption per se.
Since our concern is to characterize policy incentives, we will focus on the “rule issue” throughout the paper by analyzing
how the relative consumption concerns affect the policy rule for the state-variable public good. Hence, we will not deal with
the “level issue,” i.e., not analyze whether the levels of public goods in equilibrium will be smaller or larger than what they
would have been in an economy where people had preferences without relative consumption concerns.11
Let u^2t ¼ u2t ðc1t ;1ϕl1t ; x1tþ1; ct1; ct ; ctþ1;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ denote the utility faced by the mimicker of generation t based on the
function u2t ðUÞ in Eq. (1). We can then define the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private
consumption for the young and old ability-type i, and for the young and old mimicker, in period t as follows:
MRSi;tG;c 
uit;Gt
uit;c
; MRSi;tG;x 
uit1;Gt
uit1;x
; MR^S2;tG;c 
u^2t;Gt
u^2t;c
; and MR^S2;tG;x 
u^2t1;Gt
u^2t1;x
:
To shorten the formulas to be derived, we shall also use the short notation
MBt;G ∑
i
nitMRS
i;t
G;cþ∑
i
nit1MRS
i;t
G;x ð16Þ
for the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for the public good (measured as the marginal rate of substitution between
the public good and private consumption) among those alive in period t. We will also use the notation
Ωt  λt u^2t;c½MRS1;tG;cMR^S2;tG;cþλt1u^
2
t1;x½MRS1;tG;xMR^S2;tG;x ð17Þ
for the difference in the marginal value attached to the public good between low-ability type and the mimicker (measured
both for the young and old) in period t. To facilitate later interpretations, we assume that MBt;G is decreasing in Gt .
12 We are
now able to derive the following result:
Proposition 1. The optimal provision of the public good is characterized by
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;GþΩtþ τ
MBtþ τ;G
Ntþ τγtþ τ
∂ℒ
∂ctþ τ
 
½1ξτ ¼ 1: ð18Þ
Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the reference
consumption in period t, i.e., ∂ℒ=∂ct , will be called the positionality effect in period t, and reflects the overall welfare
consequences of an increase in ct , holding each individual’s own consumption constant. As such, it is a measure of the
“positional externality” of private consumption. While it is reasonable to expect ∂ℒ=∂ct to be negative, since for each
individual uit;cto0 and u
i
t;ct  1
o0, it is theoretically possible that it is positive due to effects through the self-selection
constraint discussed more thoroughly in the following sections.
Before interpreting Proposition 1 further, let us consider the special case where ξ¼ 1. In this case, the state-variable
public good is equivalent to an atemporal control (or flow) variable, i.e., Gt ¼ gt , and hence we can simplify Eq. (18) and
obtain11 The distinction between the rule and level issues of public good provision can also be exemplified in the context of comparisons between first- and
second-best models. The rule issue then refers to the comparison between the optimal second-best provision rule and the first-best (Samuelson) rule,
whereas the level issue addresses whether the optimal level of the public good is larger or smaller in equilibrium in a second-best economy than in a first-
best one. The answers to the rule and level issues have often been shown to be quite different, see, e.g., Chang (2000) and Gaube (2000, 2005). Wendner
and Goulder (2008) is as far as we know the only paper that has dealt with the level issue of public good provision in a second-best model with relative
consumption concerns.
12 A sufficient – but not necessary – condition for this property to hold is that private and public consumption, if measured in the same period, are
weak complements in the utility function.
T. Aronsson, O. Johansson-Stenman / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 68 (2014) 390–410396Corollary 1. If the public good is a flow variable, so that ξ¼ 1, then the optimal provision of the public good satisfies
MBt;GþΩt
MBt;G
Ntγt
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ 1: ð19Þ
Eq. (19) is analogous to the formula for public provision derived in a static model by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman
(2008). The right-hand side is the direct marginal cost of providing the public good, which is measured as the marginal rate
of transformation between the public good and the private consumption good and is normalized to one, whereas the left-
hand side is interpretable as the marginal benefit of the public good adjusted for the influences of the self-selection
constraint and positional preferences, respectively. With a flow variable public good, the main differences between a static
model and the intertemporal model analyzed here are that the self-selection effect and positionality effect relevant for
public provision in period t reflect the incentives facing generations t and t1, as the high-ability type in each of these
generations may act as a mimicker in period t.
Let us now return to the case with a state-variable public good, i.e., where ξo1. Eq. (18) essentially combines the policy
rule for a state-variable public good in an OLG model without positional preferences (see Pirttilä and Tuomala, 2001) with
an indicator of how the marginal benefit of an incremental public good is modified by relative consumption concerns. Again,
the right-hand side is the direct marginal cost of a small increase in the contribution to the public good in period t, which is
measured as the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the private consumption good, whereas the
left-hand side measures the marginal benefit of an increase in the contribution to the public good in period t adjusted for
the influences of the self-selection constraint and positional preferences, respectively. Note that this measure of adjusted
marginal benefit is intertemporal as an increase in gt , ceteris paribus, affects the utility of each ability-type, as well as the
self-selection constraint and the welfare the government attaches to increased reference consumption, in all future periods.
The latter means that the marginal benefit of an increment to the public good in period t depends on an intertemporal sum
of positionality effects; not just the positionality effect in period t. Therefore, positional concerns affect state-variable and
flow-variable public goods differently. This will be described more thoroughly below.
Optimal provision rules with keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences
The positionality effect included in Eq. (18) is crucial for our understanding of how the incentives underlying public
provision depend on the relative consumption concerns. In this section, we assume that the positional preferences are of the
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses type, meaning that each individual derives utility from his/her own current consumption
relative to the current average consumption in the economy as a whole, and that each individual makes this comparison
both when young and when old. As indicated above, we abstract from catching-up-with-the-Joneses comparisons here;
such comparisons are addressed in the section “Optimal provision of the public good under both keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses and catching-up-with-the- Joneses preferences”. This simplification means that the variables δi;ct  citct1 and
δi;xtþ1  xitþ1ct vanish from Eq. (1) and, consequently, that the intertemporal degrees of positionality are equal to zero.
When the preferences are of the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses type, the positionality effect only reflects current degrees
of positionality. By using Eqs. (2) and (3) – which represent measures of the current degree of positionality at the individual
level – we can define the average degree of current consumption positionality in period t as follows:
αt ¼∑
i
αi;xt
nit1
Nt
þ∑
i
αi;ct
nit
Nt
Að0;1Þ: ð20aÞ
We also introduce an indicator of the difference in the degree of current consumption positionality between the
mimicker and the low-ability type in period t, αdt , such that
αdt 
λt1u^
2
t t;x
γtNt
α^2;xt α1;xt
h i
þλt u^
2
t;c
γtNt
α^2;ct α1;ct
h i
; ð20bÞ
where the ^ denotes “mimicker” (as before) and the superindex d stands for “difference.” Thus, αdt reflects an aggregate measure
of the positionality differences between the young mimicker and the young low-ability type and between the old mimicker and
the old low-ability type, respectively. Consequently, αdt 40 (o0) if the mimicker is always, i.e., both when young and old, more
(less) positional than the low-ability type. Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), the positionality effect associated
with the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses type of positional preferences can then be written as
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ Ntγt
αtαdt
1αt
: ð21Þ
Therefore, the overall welfare effect of an increase in the level of reference consumption in period t, ceteris paribus, contains
two components. The first is the average degree of current positionality, αt , which contributes to decrease the right-hand
side of Eq. (21). This negative effect arises because the utility facing each individual of generation t depends negatively on ct
via the argument citct in the utility function, and the utility facing each individual of generation t-1 depends negatively on
ct via the argument xitct . As such, the average degree of current positionality reflects the magnitude of the positional
externality. The second component in Eq. (21), αdt , appears because the mimicker and the (mimicked) low-ability type
T. Aronsson, O. Johansson-Stenman / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 68 (2014) 390–410 397typically differ with respect to the degree of positionality, which the government may exploit to relax the self-selection
constraint. If αdt 40 (o0), then increased reference consumption in period t leads to a relaxation (tightening) of the self-
selection constraint, as it means that the mimicker is hurt more (less) than the low-ability type. As a consequence, this effect
may either counteract (αdt 40) or reinforce (α
d
t o0) the negative positional consumption externality.
By substituting Eq. (21) into Eq. (18), we can derive the following result:
Proposition 2. The optimal provision of the public good based on keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences is characterized by
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G
1αdtþ τ
1αtþ τ
þΩtþ τ
" #
½1ξτ ¼ 1: ð22Þ
The interesting aspect of Proposition 2 is that the direct effects of positional concerns are captured by a single multiplier,
ð1αdtþ τÞ=ð1αtþ τÞ, which is interpretable as the “positionality weight” in period tþτ. The average degree of positionality,
αtþ τ , scales up the aggregate instantaneous marginal benefit, ceteris paribus, and, therefore, contributes to increase the
provision of the public good. As explained above, the effect of αdtþ τ (the measure of differences in the degree of positionality
between the mimicker and the low-ability type) can be either positive or negative. If αdtþ τ40, this mechanism contributes to
scale down the marginal benefit of public consumption in period tþτ. The intuition is, of course, that additional resources
spent on private consumption leads to a relaxation of the self-selection constraint in this case (as the mimicker is more
positional than the low-ability type). If αdtþ τo0, on the other hand, this mechanism works in the opposite direction.
Therefore, a sufficient (not necessary) condition for the positionality weight in period tþτ to scale up the aggregate
instantaneous marginal benefit of the public good in that period is that αdtþ τr0, for which a sufficient condition in turn is
that the low-ability type is always at least as positional as the mimicker. By noting that
γtþ τ
γt
¼ 1ð1þrtþ1Þð1þrtþ2Þ⋯ð1þrtþ τÞ
;
we derive the following more general result in the Appendix:
Proposition 3. Conditional on MBtþ τ;G; Ωtþ τ; and rtþ τ for all τZ0, a necessary and sufficient condition for the joint impact
of present and future positionality effects to increase the contribution to the public good in period t is that
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
MBtþ τ;G
αtþ ταdtþ τ
1αtþ τ
½1ξτ40:
Hence, a sufficient condition is that the low-ability type is predominantly at least as positional as the mimicker in the sense that
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
MBtþ τ;G
αdtþ τ
1αtþ τ
½1ξτr0:
Note that even though the second condition in Proposition 3 is much stronger than the first, it still does not require the low-
ability types to be at least as positional as the mimickers in all periods. Instead, as long as the low-ability type is
predominantly at least as positional as the mimicker – which imposes a condition on a weighted average of future
differences in the degree of positionality – this is perfectly consistent with the possibility that the mimicker is more
positional than the low-ability type during certain periods or intervals of time.
By “the joint impact of present and future positionality effects” we thus mean the effect of including the positionality
weight in the provision formula, ceteris paribus. Of course, when comparing this provision rule with the conventional one
(i.e., with no impact of positional concerns), it is clear that the individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for the public good,
as well as the various Lagrange multipliers, will be different too in the different equilibria. Nevertheless, in the limit case
where the joint impact of present and future positionality effects is small, these differences will presumably be small as well.
This suggests that the conditions in Proposition 3 may also approximately hold as to when the optimal public good provision
level according to Eq. (22) will be higher than the level that would follow (in equilibrium) with the conventional provision
rule. Hence, it appears fair to say that for a rather broad set of assumptions, applying the modified provision rule in Eq. (22)
tends to imply a higher level of public good provision compared with the conventional provision rule that does not reflect
the positionality effect.13
Let us next consider conditions for when the second-best adjustments through the impacts on the self-selection
constraints, i.e., the effects of the variables Ωt and αdt for all t, vanish from the policy rule for public provision. We have
derived the following result:13 Nevertheless, this conclusion should not be confused with the level issue in the sense of comparing the optimal provision levels in equilibrium based
on preferences with and without relative consumption elements.
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written as Uit ¼ qitðhtðcit ; xitþ1;Δi;ct ;Δi;xtþ1;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ; zitÞ for all t, then the optimal policy rule for the public good is given by
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G
1αtþ τ
½1ξτ ¼ 1: ð23Þ
Note that while we still allow for type-specific preferences, here the function htðUÞ is common to all consumers of
generation t. In the absence of relative consumption concerns (in which case αt  0 for all t), Eq. (23) coincides with a
dynamic analog to the standard Samuelson condition. This result is modified here because the policy rule still reflects a
desire to correct for positional externalities, which works to increase the marginal benefit of the public good (since
1=ð1αtÞ41 for all t by assumption). The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that if leisure is weakly separable from the other
goods in the utility function – and with the additional restriction that the function htðU Þ is common for the two ability types
– it follows that Ωt ¼ αdt ¼ 0 for all t, i.e., neither the marginal willingness to pay for the public good nor the degree of
positionality differs between the mimicker and the low-ability type. Thus, there is no longer an incentive for the
government to modify the provision of the public good to relax the self-selection constraint.
Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), it is interesting to consider the role of preference elicitation for the
public good. Note first that individual benefits of the public good are so far measured by each individual’s marginal
willingness to pay for a small increment, ceteris paribus, i.e., while holding everything else fixed, including others’ private
consumption. In a much discussed evaluation of the so-called contingent valuation method for valuing non-market goods,
Arrow et al. (1993) recommended the use of a referendum method as a payment vehicle. This means that people are asked
whether they would vote yes or no in a referendum concerning the provision (or increased provision) of the public good
combined with a payment for this good, typically a tax or charge that would affect all people. We will here focus on the
natural benchmark case where all people would have to pay the same amount, although we briefly discuss another
interesting possibility in the concluding section.
In conventional economic models without social comparisons, each individual’s marginal willingness to pay for the
public good does not depend on whether others’ private consumption will change in response to increased public provision.
On the other hand, if people are concerned with their relative consumption, it does matter how the marginal willingness to
pay is measured.14 To see this, let us define the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private
consumption at any time, t, conditional on the requirement that citct and xitþ1ctþ1 remain constant, which would follow
if the willingness to pay question was supplemented with the information that everybody has to pay the same amount as
the respondent for an incremental public good.
With reference to Eq. (1), this measure of marginal willingness to pay, conditional on that others would have to pay
equally much on the margin, can then be defined as follows:
Definition. An individual’s conditional marginal willingness to pay for the public good when young and old, respectively,
is defined by:
CMRSi;tG;c 
vit;Gt
vit;c
; ð24aÞ
CMRSi;tG;x 
vit1;Gt
vit1;x
: ð24bÞ
In a way similar to Eq. (16), we may construct an aggregate marginal benefit measure consisting of the sum of all people’s
(alive in period t) marginal willingness to pay for the public good, conditional on that others will also have to pay equally
much on the margin, as follows:
CMBt;G ∑
i
nit CMRS
i;t
G;cþ∑
i
nit1 CMRS
i;t
G;x: ð25Þ
The question is then how the optimal provision rule will change if expressed as a function of CMBt;G instead of MBt;G.
By using
Ψ t  cov
1αt
1αt
;
CMRStG;c
CMRStG;c
0
@
1
A
as a short notation for the (normalized) covariance between the degree of non-positionality, measured by 1αit , and the
marginal willingness to pay for the public good, we have14 This idea was discussed in a first best setting already by Ng (1987), who noticed that relative consumption concerns tend to reduce each individual’s
marginal willingness to pay for the public good (if measured with the reference consumption held constant), which, in turn, counteracts the incentive to
internalize externalities through increased public provision.
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optimal policy rule for public good provision is given by
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
CMBtþ τ;G½1þΨ tþ τ½1αdtþ τþΩtþ τ
h i
½1ξτ ¼ 1: ð26Þ
Compared with Eq. (22), we can observe two differences (in addition to the replacement of MBtþ τ;G with CMBtþ τ;G). First
and foremost, the benefit-amplifying factor 1=ð1αtþ τÞ is not part of Eq. (26). The intuition is straightforward. If others’
consumption is held constant, each individual’s willingness to pay for increased public good provision would be reduced by
the fact that his/her relative consumption decreases. However, if each individual’s relative consumption is held constant, as
in Proposition 5, there is obviously no such effect. Second, Eq. (26) includes a factor ½1þΨ tþ τ, for which the intuition can be
given as follows. If the conditional marginal WTP differs between the types, then those with a higher conditional marginal
WTP will obtain a utility increase, while the others may face a utility loss. The utility increase, in monetary terms, will more
than outweigh the utility loss if and only if those with a higher conditional marginal WTP are less positional, i.e., if and only
if the covariance between the degree of non-positionality and the conditional marginal WTP is positive.
It is finally interesting to analyze whether there is some special case in which the second-best policy rule for the public
good reduces to a first-best policy rule. It turns out that there is, and the following result gives sufficient conditions under
which an intertemporal analog to the Samuelson rule applies:
Proposition 6. If – in addition to the conditions underlying Proposition 4 – we assume that (i) the degree of positionality is the
same for both ability types in all periods, both when young and when old, and (ii) the market interest rate is constant over time,
then the optimal provision of the public good, expressed in terms of conditional marginal WTPs, is given by
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
CMBt;G
ð1þrÞτ ½1ξ
τ ¼ 1: ð27Þ
Given that the degree of current consumption positionality is the same for everybody (in which case there is no correlation
between the marginal willingness to pay and the degree of current consumption positionality at the individual level), a
weighted sum over time of instantaneous marginal benefits should equal the marginal cost of an incremental public good. In
other words, an intertemporal analog to the traditional Samuelson rule applies. What is less clear, perhaps, is how we
should apply this or any other policy rule in practice, as we would need information about future generations’ marginal
willingness to pay for the public good. However, before taking the discussion about implementation to any greater detail,
it is important to know the point of departure.
Note also that in the special case where ξ¼ 1, i.e., the case where the public good is a flow variable, Proposition 6 implies
Corollary 2. In addition to the conditions governing Proposition 6 (except for a constant interest rate which is not needed here),
suppose that the public good is a flow variable so that ξ¼ 1. The policy rule for the public good then simplifies to read
CMBt;G ¼ 1: ð28Þ
Corollary 2 thus implies that the conventional Samuelson (1954) rule, expressed in marginal willingness to pay conditional
on the fact that also others have to pay on the margin, holds for each moment in time.
Optimal provision of the public good under both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-Joneses
preferences
The analysis carried out in the previous section is based on the assumption that the only measure of reference
consumption at the individual level, in any period, is based on the average consumption in that particular period. Although
this idea accords well with earlier literature on public policy and positional preferences, it neglects the possibility that
agents also compare their own current consumption with both their own past consumption and that of other people. In this
section, we present and analyze the more general model that takes all these comparisons into account.
Note once again that Eq. (18) holds generally, i.e., irrespective of which form the relative consumption concerns take.
To be able to consider keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences simultaneously with catching-up-with-the-Joneses
preferences, we must explore the positionality effect, ∂ℒ=∂ct , for this more general case. The positionality effect will then
depend on both the current and intertemporal degrees of positionality. Therefore, in a way similar to the average degree of
current consumption positionality in Eq. (20a), we use Eqs. (4) and (5) to define the average degree of intertemporal
consumption positionality as follows:
βt ¼∑
i
βi;xt
nit1
Nt
þ∑
i
βi;ct
nit
Nt
Að0;1Þ: ð29aÞ
Furthermore, and by analogy to the variable αdt defined in Eq. (20b), which is a summary measure of differences in the
degree of current positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type in period t, we define a corresponding
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βdt ¼
λt1u^
2
t t;x
γtNt
β^
2;x
t β1;xt
h i
þλt u^
2
t;c
γtNt
β^
2;c
t β1;ct
h i
: ð29bÞ
The variable βdt has the same general interpretation as α
d
t . In other words, β
d
t 40 (o0) if the young and old mimickers in
period t are more (less) positional than the corresponding low-ability type, where positionality is measured relative to other
people’s past consumption. To simplify the notation and facilitate comparison with Eq. (21), we use the following short
notation:
Bt ¼
Ntγt ½αdt αt 
1αt
þNtþ1γtþ1½β
d
tþ1βtþ1
1αt
:
We show in the Appendix (along with the proof of Proposition 7 below) that the positionality effect associated with this
more general model can be written as
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ Btþ ∑
1
i ¼ 1
Btþ i ∏
i
j ¼ 1
βtþ j
1αtþ j1
: ð30Þ
The variable Bt in Eq. (30) is analogous to the right-hand side of Eq. (21) with the modification that it also reflects the
intertemporal (not just the current) degrees of positionality. As such, it contains two additional components. First,
Ntþ1γtþ1βtþ1=ð1αtÞo0 is interpretable as the value of the positional externality associated with the catching-up-with-
the-Joneses motive for relative consumption comparisons. The underlying mechanism is, of course, that ct directly affects
individual utility negatively via the argument xitþ1ct in the utility function. Second, the component Ntþ1γtþ1βdtþ1=ð1αtÞ
reflects the corresponding welfare effects through the self-selection mechanism in period tþ1. In a way similar to the
analogous measure of differences in the current degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type, this
effect means that increased reference consumption in period t may either contribute to relax ðβdtþ140Þ or tighten ðβdtþ1o0Þ
the self-selection constraint. The final component on the right-hand side of Eq. (30) arises due to an intertemporal chain
reaction: the intuition is that the catching-up-with-the-Joneses motive for consumption comparisons, i.e., that other
people’s past consumption affects utility, means that the welfare effects of changes in the reference consumption are no
longer time-separable (as they would be without intertemporal consumption comparisons).
By substituting Eq. (30) into Eq. (18), we can derive the following result:
Proposition 7. The optimal provision of the public good based on keeping-up-with–the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-
Joneses preferences is characterized as
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;GþΩtþ τ
MBtþ τ;G
Ntþ τγtþ τ
Btþ ∑
1
i ¼ 1
Btþ i ∏
i
j ¼ 1
βtþ j
1αtþ j1
" #" #
½1ξτ ¼ 1: ð31Þ
The basic intuition behind Proposition 7 is analogous to that of Proposition 2, yet with the modification that the catching-
up-with-the-Joneses motive for consumption comparisons is present in Eq. (31). This means that (i) increases in the average
degrees of positionality (in both the current and intertemporal dimensions) typically contribute to increased provision of
the public good, and (ii) differences in the degrees of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type
contribute to increase (decrease) the optimal provision of the public good if the low-ability type is predominantly more
(less) positional than the mimicker in both dimensions, ceteris paribus.
At the same time, Eq. (31) is not very tractable, due to the intertemporal chain reaction caused by the catching-up-with-
the-Joneses motive for relative consumption, and the interpretation of its different components is far from obvious. Yet, by
making some additional simplifying assumptions, we are able to simplify the positionality effect given by Eq. (30) con-
siderably, and also derive a policy rule for public provision that takes the same form as Eq. (22).
Assumptions A. αt ¼ α; βt ¼ β; αdt ¼ αd; βdt ¼ βd; Nt ¼N; and rt ¼ r 8t
In other words, the population size and interest rate are assumed to be constant over time, as are our measures of average
degrees of positionality and positionality differences between the types of people. While these are of course important
restrictions, they are hardly very strong assumptions, and similar assumptions are frequently made in the comparable
catching-up-with-the-Joneses literature.15 These assumptions are consistent with, but are not sufficient conditions for, a
growth path with a constant growth rate. It should also be noted that the model is still general enough to reflect different
preferences between ability-types including different degrees of positionality.
Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014b), we can now define the average degree of total consumption
positionality and the difference in the degree of total consumption positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability15 See, e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Díaz et al. (2003).
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ρ αþ β
1þr;
ρd  αdþ β
d
1þr:
Therefore, the average degree of total consumption positionality is measured as the average degree of current
consumption positionality plus the present value of the average degree of intertemporal consumption positionality; the
reason for calculating the present value is, of course, that the intertemporal externality caused in period t gives rise to
disutility in period tþ1. We are not aware of any study that simultaneously attempts to estimate the average degree of
current and intertemporal consumption positionality, which is an important task for future research. Moreover, although
these two measures are distinctly different from one another and in principle possible to estimate independently,16 one
cannot rule out that existing estimates of current consumption positionality partly reflect also intertemporal consumption
positionality.
In a similar way, the measure of differences in the degree of total consumption positionality between the mimicker and
the low-ability type, ρd, reflects differences in the degree of current consumption positionality, αd, and the (present value of)
differences in intertemporal positionality, βd=ð1þrÞ. We can then, under Assumption A, show (see Appendix) that Eq. (30)
reduces to
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼Nγt
ρdρ
1ρ ;
which takes the same general form as in the absence of the catching-up-with-the-Joneses motive for relative consumption,
i.e., as Eq. (21). This implies that we are able to present straightforward extensions of Propositions 2–6 and Corollary 2 to the
more general case, where we also consider catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences:
Proposition 2’. Under Assumption A, and based on keeping-up-with–the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-Joneses prefer-
ences, the optimal provision of the public good is characterized as
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G
1ρd
1ρ þΩtþ τ
 
½1ξτ ¼ 1: ð32Þ
Technically, the only difference compared with Eq. (22) is that the positionality weight based on current degrees,
ð1αdÞ=ð1αÞ, is here replaced with a corresponding positionality weight based on total degrees, ð1ρdÞ=ð1ρÞ. The
intuition is that comparisons with other people’s past consumption imply that the (young and old) individuals alive today
impose a negative positional externality on the individuals alive in the next period, i.e., the higher the consumption in
period t, ceteris paribus, the greater the utility loss due to lower relative consumption in period tþ1. As such, this
intertemporal externality must be considered simultaneously with the (atemporal) externality that affects others today.
Due to Assumption A, the striking implication of Proposition 2’ is that the current and intertermporal aspects of
consumption positionality affect the incentives for public good provision in exactly the same way. Therefore, the following
results for when positional concerns lead to increased contributions to the public good are analogous to Proposition 3:
Proposition 3’. Suppose that the relative consumption concerns are based on both keeping-up and catching-up-with-the-
Joneses preferences. Under Assumption A, and conditional on MBtþ τ;G and Ωtþ τ for all τZ0, a necessary and sufficient condition
for the joint impact of present and future positionality effects to increase the contribution to the public good in period t is that
ρρd40. Hence, a sufficient condition is that the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker in the sense that ρdr0.
Again, the result from the section “Optimal provision rules with keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences” carries over
with the only modifications that α and αdare replaced with ρ and ρd, respectively. Let us then consider conditions for when
the second-best adjustments through the impacts on the self-selection constraints vanish from the policy rule for public
provision. We can derive the following analog to Proposition 4:
Proposition 4’. Given the conditions underlying Proposition 3’, and if leisure is weakly separable from private and public
consumption in the sense that the utility function can be written as Uit ¼ qitðhtðcit ; xitþ1;Δi;ct ;Δi;xtþ1; δi;ct ; δi;xtþ1;Gt ;Gtþ1Þ; zitÞ for all t,
then the optimal provision of the public good is characterized as
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G
1ρ ½1ξ
τ ¼ 1: ð33Þ
Note that the separability condition in this case also includes the variables reflecting consumption comparisons over time.
Consequently, the conditions for when the second-best adjustments through the impacts on the self-selection constraints16 One way would be to modify the questionnaire-experimental method developed by Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) such that the subjects would
make choices based on information about levels of their own current consumption, the current average consumption, and past average consumption.
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government has an incentive to correct for (current and intertemporal) positional externalities, even if it is unable to use the
public good as an instrument to relax the self-selection constraint.
As a final concern, let us once again define the marginal willingness to pay for the public good with all relevant measures
of relative consumption held constant. What are the implications of adding the catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences to
the model analyzed in the section “Optimal provision rules with keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences”?17 By using
Λt ¼ cov
1αtβt
1αtβt
;
CMRStG;c
CMRStG;c
0
@
1
A
to denote the (normalized) covariance between the total degree of non-positionality, measured by 1αtβt , and the
conditional marginal WTP for the public good, we have the following analog to Proposition 5:
Proposition 5’. The optimal provision of the public good based on the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-
Joneses preferences and Assumption A, and expressed in terms of conditional marginal WTPs, can be characterized as
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
CMBtþ τ;G
1αβ
1ρ 1þΛtþ τ½  1ρ
d
h i
þΩtþ τ
 
½1ξτ ¼ 1: ð34Þ
There is one important difference between Propositions 5 and 5’. If all relative consumption concerns are governed by the
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses motive, as in Proposition 5, then the average degree of consumption positionality vanishes
from the policy rule for the contribution to the public good. In Eq. (26), therefore, there was no incentive to modify the
formula for public provision in order to correct for positional externalities. This result no longer applies in Eq. (34),
since ð1αβÞ=ð1ρÞo1. Although the marginal WTPs for each generation are measured with all aspects of relative
consumption held constant at the individual level, discounting of intertemporal positionality degrees tends to reduce the
social cost of increased reference consumption. Consequently, if the relative consumption concerns (or parts thereof) are
driven by a catching-up-with-the-Joneses motive, there is an incentive for the government to reduce the contribution to
the public good, ceteris paribus, to reach the optimal level of correction for positional externalities. The intuition is that the
catching-up-with-the-Joneses type of externality is characterized by a time-lag between cause and effect and must,
therefore, be internalized before the welfare loss actually surfaces; e.g., because each individual’s consumption in period t
leads to positional externalities in period tþ1. The social cost of spending one additional dollar on public consumption in
period t, relative to spending it in period tþ1, is given by γt=γtþ1 ¼ 1þr. Thus, if the government at any time t plans to
internalize a positional externality in period tþ1, it is more costly to do so if this externality is generated by a catching-up-
with-the-Joneses comparison than a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses comparison, which explains why externality correction
leads to a smaller contribution to the public good in Eq. (34) than in Eq. (26), ceteris paribus.
For the same reason, adding a catching-up-with-the-Joneses motive for relative consumption also implies that we have
to modify the results presented in Proposition 6 and Corollary 2, the analogs of which are presented as follows:
Proposition 6’. If – in addition to the conditions in Proposition 4’ – we assume that the degree of current and intertemporal
positionality, respectively, does not differ among ability types, neither for young nor for old individuals, then the optimal provision
of the public good, expressed in terms of conditional marginal WTPs, is given by
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
CMBtþ τ;G
1αβ
1ρ ½1ξ
τ ¼ 1: ð35Þ
Corollary 2’. If – in addition to the conditions in Proposition 6’ – the public good is a flow variable, so that ξ¼ 1, then the
optimal provision of the public good is given by
CMBt;G
1αβ
1ρ ¼ 1: ð36Þ
Eq. (36) is interpretable as an analog to the basic Samuelson rule, expressed in terms of marginal willingness to pay
conditional on that others will also have to pay the same amount for the public good on the margin. Note also that if the
interest rate is small enough, meaning that the scale factor on the left-hand side of Eq. (36) is close to one, then the
conventional Samuelson condition will still provide a reasonable rule-of-thumb for public provision. This insight is clearly
remarkable, since we simultaneously consider (i) a second-best problem with asymmetric information between the
government and the private sector, (ii) distributional concerns, (iii) keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences, (iv) catching-
up-with-the-Joneses preferences, and (v) internal habit formation. Yet, needless to say, the fact that we are not able to claim17 With catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences, this presupposes that each individual’s marginal willingness to pay is measured conditional on the
fact that also the earlier generation pays the same amount at the margin. Therefore, such a payment vehicle is based on a more complex thought
experiment than when all relative consumption concerns are driven by the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses comparison.
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constitute good approximations of the real world.
Conclusion
The present paper is, as far as we know, the first to consider public good provision in a dynamic second-best economy
with asymmetric information under optimal taxation, where people care about relative consumption. The model used is an
extension of the standard optimal nonlinear income tax model with two ability types. Our approach recognizes three
mechanisms behind the positional concerns: each individual compares his/her current consumption with (i) his/her own
past consumption, (ii) other people’s current consumption (keeping-up-with-the-Joneses), and (iii) other people’s past
consumption (catching-up-with-the-Joneses). As such, the present paper has in several respects generalized the literature
on optimal public expenditure when relative consumption matters.
For presentational reasons, we began by analyzing the simpler case where the comparison with other people’s
consumption is limited to their current consumption. This situation enabled us to derive several distinct results with
respect to the consequences of positional preferences for the optimal provision of public goods. Clearly, as the public good in
our model is a state variable, the effects of positional preferences are more complex than in the static model analyzed by
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008). The reason is that the marginal benefit of an incremental contribution to the
public good in period t reflects the present value of all future instantaneous marginal benefits. Consider the case where the
differences in the degrees of positionality between consumers are small. Then, if each individual’s marginal willingness to
pay for the public good is measured by holding the contributions by others constant, it follows that the more positional
people are on average now and in the future, ceteris paribus, the larger the optimal contributions to the public good through
adjustments of the optimal policy rule in response to positional externalities. Yet, this is not the case when a referendum
format is used, where people are asked for their marginal willingness to pay conditional on the fact that others will also
have to pay for the increased public provision. In the latter case, additional conditions are presented for when a dynamic
analog of the conventional Samuelson (1954) rule applies.
Adding the intertemporal aspects of relative consumption comparisons gives a richer structure, as it enables us to
distinguish between the current and intertemporal degrees of consumption positionality. Although a catching-up-with-the-
Joneses motive for relative consumption gives rise to the same basic policy incentives as those caused by a keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses motive, comparisons with others’ past consumption make the analysis more complex, as the welfare effects of a
change in the reference consumption in period t effectively become dependent on the preferences of all future generations.
Still, for the case where the degrees of (current and intertemporal) consumption positionality are constant over time,
we derive a set of distinct results for public good provision when the relative consumption concerns are governed by
both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences. Here, the total degree of consumption
positionality plays largely the same general role as the current degree of positionality does when all relative consumption
concerns are driven by the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses type of preferences.
Let us now return to the problem of climate change discussed initially. The results are then interpretable to mean that
relative consumption concerns, whether in comparison with others’ current or previous consumption, do have important
implications for the calculations of future costs and benefits of climate change policy, and our contribution is to show how
such concerns modify the conventional cost-benefit analysis. However, it is also demonstrated that the cost-benefit analysis
of climate change can under certain conditions be based on a conventional dynamic analog to the Samuelson condition,
provided that the individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for reduced climate emissions is calculated such that each
individual’s relative consumption (rather than others’ consumption) is held constant.18 Perhaps the latter is the most
important finding for applied economists who intend to estimate the benefits of investing to reduce climate change
emissions, now and in the future: if each individual’s marginal willingness to pay is measured with the relative consumption
held constant, there is no need to adjust the cost-benefit rule for positional externalities generated by a keeping-up-with-
the-Joneses type of comparison. Indeed, as is demonstrated, the resulting optimal provision rule becomes surprisingly
simple for quite reasonable benchmark cases, despite a quite general and complex underlying model.
Still, as with all theoretical models, the results naturally follow from the assumptions. In the present paper, we have
consistently assumed that each individual compares his/her consumption level with the average consumption level in
society, which is (largely for convenience) the most commonly used assumption in the literature. Yet, there are of course
alternatives. For example, if we were to follow Abel (2005) and assume that each individual only compares his/her own
consumption with the average consumption of his/her cohort, the exact form of the positionality effect would differ from
Eq. (30), although most qualitative results would still prevail.19 In particular, when a referendum format is used to elicit the
marginal willingness to pay, basically the same simplification of the optimal provision rule would occur. The reason is, of
course, that an additional public good provision combined with the referendum payment vehicle would still keep the
relative consumption constant for all individuals. The same argument applies (and for the same reason) if we instead follow18 The many practical problems associated with calculating such costs and benefits for future generations are of course immense, and beyond the scope
of this paper.
19 Readers who would like to explore this path are referred to Section 3.4 in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014b), who develop such a model but
without public goods.
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ability individuals (or any combination of people for that matter).20
Yet, one may of course also consider other versions of the referendum payment vehicle itself. As suggested by one of the
referees, a natural alternative is to ask each individual about his/her marginal willingness to pay given that other people
have to pay the same fraction of their income as the respondent. Increased provision of the public good would then imply
increased relative consumption for the low-ability type and a corresponding decrease for the high-ability type. With
difference comparisons, this payment vehicle would clearly modify the public good provision rule compared with the rules
derived above. Yet, if we were to combine this payment vehicle with a utility function where the relative consumption is
measured by consumption ratios rather than consumption differences, then a public good increase combined with such a
referendum payment vehicle would again imply that the relative consumption is held fixed for all.
In our view, the problems of identifying optimal public policy responses in a world where people are motivated also by
social comparisons are generally under-researched, and there are many important aspects left to explore in future research.
Examples include public provision of private goods and optimal taxation in a multi-country setting where people also
compare their own consumption levels with those in other countries. It would also be useful to supplement existing studies
that largely focus on algebraic solutions with simulations to quantify the importance of relative consumption concerns
(based on different types of consumption comparisons) for optimal taxation as well as public good provision.Acknowledgment
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Appendix.
First-order conditions for consumers
The first-order conditions for work hours and savings can be written as follows, if expressed in terms of the utility
formulation uitðUÞ in Eq. (1),
uit;cw
i
t ½1T ’tðwitlitÞuit;z ¼ 0;
uit;cþuit;x½1þrtþ1ð1Φ’tþ1ðsitrtþ1ÞÞ ¼ 0;
where uit;c  ∂uit=∂cit ;uit;z  ∂uit=∂zit and uit;x  ∂uit=∂xitþ1, and T ’tðwitlitÞ and Φ’tþ1ðsitrtþ1Þ are the marginal labor income tax rate
and the marginal capital income tax rate, respectively.
First-order conditions of the second-best problem
The first-order conditions for l1t , c
1
t , x
1
tþ1, l
2
t , c
2
t , x
2
tþ1, Ktþ1, Gt , and gt are given by
 ∂W
∂ðn1t U1t Þ
n1t u
1
t;zþλt u^2t;z ϕtþ l1t
∂ϕt
∂l1t
" #
þγtn1t w1t ¼ 0; ðA1Þ
∂W
∂ðn1t U1t Þ
n1t u
1
t;cλt u^2t;cγtn1t þ
n1t
Nt
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ 0; ðA2Þ
∂W
∂ðn1t U1t Þ
n1t u
1
t;xλt u^2t;xγtþ1n1t þ
n1t
Ntþ1
∂ℒ
∂ctþ1
¼ 0; ðA3Þ
 ∂W
∂ðn2t U2t Þ
n2t þλt
" #
u2t;zþλt u^2t;zl1t
∂ϕt
∂l2t
þγtn2t w2t ¼ 0; ðA4Þ20 However, in this case the optimal provision rule based on unconditional marginal willingness-to-pay measures would have to be modified in a non-
trivial way compared with the results presented above. With upward comparisons, the marginal willingness to pay of the low-ability type does not need to
be adjusted for positional concerns, since all positional externalities are generated by the high-ability type.
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∂ðn2t U2t Þ
n2t þλt
" #
u2t;cγtn2t þ
n2t
Nt
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ 0; ðA5Þ
∂W
∂ðn2t U2t Þ
n2t þλt
" #
u2t;xγtþ1n2t þ
n2t
Ntþ1
∂ℒ
∂ctþ1
¼ 0; ðA6Þ
γtþ1ð1þrtþ1Þγt ¼ 0; ðA7Þ
∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnitUitÞ
nitu
i
t;Gt þ
∂W
∂ðnit1Uit1Þ
nit1u
i
t1;Gt
" #
þλt u2t;Gt  u^
2
t;Gt
h i
þλt1½u2t1;Gt  u^
2
t1;Gt þμtþ1ð1ξÞμt ¼ 0 ðA8Þ
γtþμt ¼ 0; ðA9Þ
where we have used that wit ¼ FLi ðL1t ; L2t ;KtÞ for i¼1,2, and rt ¼ FK ðL1t ; L2t ;KtÞ from Eqs. (10) and (11), i.e., from the first-order
conditions of the firm.
Proof. of Proposition 1
We start by rewriting Eq. (A8) as
∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnituitÞ
nitu
i
t;cMRS
i;t
G;cþ
∂W
∂ðnit1uit1Þ
nit1u
i
t1;xMRS
i;t
G;x
" #
þλt u2t;Gt  u^
2
t;Gt
h i
þλt1 u2t1;Gt  u^
2
t1;Gt
h i
þμtþ1ð1ξÞμt ¼ 0: ðA10Þ
Next we rewrite Eqs. (A2), (A3), (A5), and (A6) as
∂W
∂ðn1t U1t Þ
n1t u
1
t;c ¼ λt u^2t;cþγtn1t 
n1t
Nt
∂ℒ
∂ct
; ðA11Þ
∂W
∂ðn2t U2t Þ
n2t u
2
t;c ¼ λtu2t;cþγtn2t 
n2t
Nt
∂ℒ
∂ct
; ðA12Þ
∂W
∂ðn1t1U1t1Þ
n1t1u
1
t1;x ¼ λt1u^2t1;xþγtn1t1
n1t1
Nt
∂ℒ
∂ct
; ðA13Þ
∂W
∂ðn2t1U2t1Þ
n2t1u
2
t1;x ¼ λt1u2t1;xþγtn2t1
n2t1
Nt
∂ℒ
∂ct
: ðA14Þ
Substituting Eqs. (A11)–(A14) into Eq. (A10), we obtain
γt n1t MRS
1;t
G;cþn2t MRS2;tG;cþn1t1MRS1;tG;xþn2t1MRS2;tG;x
h i
1Ntγt
∂ℒ
∂ct
h i
þλt u^2t;c½MRS1;tG;cMR^S2;tG;cþλt1u^
2
t1;x½MRS1;tG;xMR^S2;tG;x
þμtþ1½1ξμt ¼ 0: ðA15Þ
Using the short notation
Θt ¼ γt n1t MRS1;tG;cþn2t MRS2;tG;cþn1t1MRS1;tG;xþn2t1MRS2;tG;x
h i
1Ntγt
∂ℒ
∂ct
h i
þλt u^2t;c½MRS1;tG;cMR^S2;tG;cþλt1u^
2
t1;x½MRS1;tG;xMR^S2;tG;x;
we have that μt ¼Θtþμtþ1 1ξ½  and hence μtþ1 ¼Θtþ1þμtþ2 1ξ½  so that
μt ¼Θtþ Θtþ1þμtþ2 1ξ½ 
 
1ξ½ 
¼Θtþ Θtþ1þ Θtþ2þμtþ3 1ξ½  1ξ½ 
 
1ξ½ 
¼ΘtþΘtþ1 1ξ½ þΘtþ2½1ξ2þ⋯¼ ∑
1
τ ¼ 0
Θtþ τ½1ξτ
¼ ∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ MBtþ τ;GþΩtþ τ
MBtþ τ;G
Ntþ τγtþ τ
∂ℒ
∂ctþ τ
 
½1ξτ ; ðA16Þ
where in the last step we have substituted back for Θt and used Eqs. (16) and (17), i.e., the definitions of MBtþ τ;G and Ωtþ τ .
Using finally that μt ¼ γt from Eq. (A9), and dividing both sides of Eq. (A16) by γt , we obtain Eq. (18).
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Since
lim
ξ-1
½1ξτ ¼ 0 for τ40 and lim
ξ-1
½1ξτ ¼ 1 for τ¼ 0;
Eq. (19) follows immediately from Eq. (18).Proof. of Proposition 2
We will here explore the positionality effect, and then substitute this into Eq. (19). The derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to ct is given by
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnit1Uit1Þ
nit1u
i
t1;ct þ ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnitUitÞ
nitu
i
t;ct
þλt1½u2t1;ct  u^
2
t1;ct þλt ½u2t;ct  u^
2
t;ct : ðA17Þ
From Eq. (1), we have uit;c ¼ vit;cþvit;Δt , uit;ct ¼ v
i
t;Δt , u
i
t;x ¼ vit;xþvit;Δt þ 1 , and uit;ct þ 1 ¼ v
i
t;Δtþ 1 , so
uit;ct ¼ α
i;c
t u
i
t;c; ðA18Þ
uit;ct þ 1 ¼ α
i;x
tþ1u
i
t;x: ðA19Þ
Corresponding expressions hold for the mimicker. By combining Eqs. (A17–A19) and the corresponding expressions for
the mimicker, we obtain
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼  ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnit1Uit1Þ
nit1α
i;x
t u
i
t1;x ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnitUitÞ
nitα
i;c
t u
i
t;c
λt1 α2;xt u2t1;x α^2;xt u^2t1;x
h i
λt α2;ct u2t;c α^2;ct u^2t;c
h i
: ðA20Þ
Substituting Eqs. (A11)–(A14) into Eq. (A20) gives
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ αtγtNt
1αt
þ 1
1αt
λt1u^
2
t1;xfα^2;xt α1;xt gþλt u^2t;cfα^2;ct α1;ct g
h i
¼Ntγt
αdt αt
1αt
; ðA21Þ
where in the last step we have used the definition of αdt . Substituting Eq. (A21) into Eq. (18) gives, finally, Eq. (22).Proof. of Proposition 3
That the joint impact of present and future positionality effects increases the contribution to the public good in period t
means that the benefit side is amplified by such effects compared with the optimal provision rule without such concerns,
i.e., that
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G
1αdtþ τ
1αtþ τ
þΩtþ τ
" #
½1ξτ4 ∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;GþΩtþ τ
 ½1ξτ;
where all variables are evaluated in the same equilibrium. Hence,
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G
1αdtþ τ
1αtþ τ
½1ξτ ∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G½1ξτ40;
which directly implies the first inequality of Proposition 3. That the second inequality constitutes a sufficient condition for
the first one is trivial since αt40 for all t.Proof. of Proposition 4
If leisure is weakly separable from private and public consumption as specified for all t, and where the sub-utility
function htðU Þ is the same for both ability types, then clearly MR^S2;tG;c ¼MRS1;tG;c and MR^S2;tG;x ¼MRS1;tG;x, implying that Ωt ¼ 0.
Moreover, the positionality degrees will be the same for the mimicker and the low-ability type, implying that α^2;ct ¼ α1;ct and
α^2;xt ¼ α1;xt , so that αdt ¼ 0 for all t. Substituting αdt ¼ 0 and Ωt ¼ 0 for all t into Eq. (22) implies Eq. (23).
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Since MRSi;tG;c ¼ uit;Gt=uit;c, CMRS
i;t
G;c ¼ vit;Gt=vit;c, and uit;Gt ¼ vit;Gt , it follows that MRS
i;t
G;c ¼ ½vit;c=uit;cCMRSi;tG;c. Using that
uit;c ¼ vit;cþvit;Δt then implies that
MRSi;tG;c ¼
vit;c
vit;cþvit;Δt
CMRSi;tG;c ¼ ð1αi;ct ÞCMRSi;tG;c: ðA22Þ
Similarly, when old we have
MRSi;tG;x ¼ ð1αi;xt ÞCMRSi;tG;x: ðA23Þ
Substituting Eqs. (A22) and (A23) into Eq. (16) then implies
MBt;G ¼∑
i
nitð1αi;ct ÞCMRSi;tG;cþ∑
i
nit1ð1αi;xt ÞCMRSi;tG;x
¼ ð1αtÞCMBt;G 1þcov
1αt
1αt
;
CMRStG;c
CMRStG;c
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
¼ ð1αtÞCMBt;G½1þΨ t ; ðA24Þ
where we have used the previously defined Ψ t . Substituting Eq. (A24) into Eq. (22) implies Eq. (26).
Proof. of Proposition 6
From the conditions in Proposition 4 it follows that αdt ¼ 0 and Ωt ¼ 0. Moreover, since the degree of positionality is the
same for both types, we also have that Ψ t ¼ 0. From Eq. (A7) it follows, since the interest rate is constant, that γtþ1=γt ¼
1=ð1þrÞ, and hence that γtþ τ=γt ¼ 1=ð1þrÞτ . Substituting these conditions into Eq. (26) gives Eq. (27).
Proof. of Corollary 2
Once again, since
lim
ξ-1
½1ξτ ¼ 0 for τ40 and lim
ξ-1
½1ξτ ¼ 1 for τ¼ 0;
Eq. (28) follows immediately from Eq. (27).
Proof. of Proposition 7
We will first derive the positionality effect in this more general case and then substitute this effect into Eq. (19).
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to ct can be written as
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnit1Uit1Þ
nit1u
i
t1;ct þ ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnitUitÞ
nitu
i
t;ct
þ ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnitþ1Uitþ1Þ
nitþ1u
i
tþ1;ct þλt1 u
2
t1;ct  u^
2
t1;ct
h i
þλt ½u2t;ct  u^
2
t;ct þλtþ1½u2tþ1;ct  u^
2
tþ1;ct : ðA25Þ
From Eq. (1) we have
uit;c ¼ vit;cþvit;Δct þv
i
t;δct
¼
vit;Δct
αi;ct
¼
vit;δct
βi;ct
;
uit;x ¼ vit;xþvit;Δxt þv
i
t;δxt
¼
vit;Δxt
αi;xtþ1
¼
vit;δxt
βi;xtþ1
;
uit;ct ¼ v
i
t;Δct
vit;δxt ;
uit;ct  1 ¼ v
i
t;δct
; ;
uit;ct þ 1 ¼ v
i
t;Δxt þ 1
;
so
uit;ct ¼ α
i;c
t u
i
t;cβi;xtþ1uit;x; ðA26Þ
uit;ct  1 ¼ β
i;c
t u
i
t;c; ðA27Þ
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i;x
tþ1u
i
t;x; ðA28Þ
which substituted into Eq. (A25) imply
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼  ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnit1Uit1Þ
nit1α
i;x
t u
i
t1;x
 ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnitUitÞ
nit α
i;c
t u
i
t;cþβi;xtþ1uit;x
h i
 ∑
2
i ¼ 1
∂W
∂ðnitþ1Uitþ1Þ
nitþ1β
i;c
tþ1u
i
tþ1;c
þλt1 α2;xt u2t1;xþ α^2;xt u2t1;x
h i
þλt α2;ct u2t;cβ2;xtþ1u2t;xþ α^2;ct u^
2
t;cþ β^
2;x
tþ1u^
2
t;x
h i
þλtþ1½β2;ctþ1u2tþ1;cþ β^
2;c
tþ1u^
2
tþ1;c: ðA29Þ
By substituting Eqs. (A11–A14) into Eq. (A29), and collecting terms, we obtain
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ ∂ℒ
∂ctþ1
βtþ1
1αt
Ntγt
αt
1αt
Ntþ1γtþ1
βtþ1
1αt
þλt1u^
2
t1;x
1αt
α^2;xt α1;xt
h i
þ λt u^
2
t;c
1αt
α^2;ct α1;ct
h i
þ λt u^
2
t;x
1αt
β^
2;x
tþ1β1;xtþ1
h i
þλtþ1u^
2
tþ1;c
1αt
β^
2;c
tþ1β1;ctþ1
h i
¼ 1
1αt
βtþ1
∂ℒ
∂ctþ1
þNtγt αdt αt
h i
þNtþ1γtþ1 βdtþ1βtþ1
h i 
; ðA30Þ
where we have used the short notations αdt and β
d
t as defined earlier. Using the definition for Bt and the short notation
φt ¼
βtþ1
1αt
;
the recursive Eq. (A30) can more conveniently be rewritten as follows:
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ Btþφt
∂ℒ
∂ctþ1
¼ Btþφt Btþ1þφtþ1
∂ℒ
∂ctþ2
 
¼ Btþφt Btþ1þφtþ1 Btþ2þφtþ2
∂ℒ
∂ctþ3
  
¼ BtþBtþ1φtþBtþ2φtφtþ1þBtþ3φtφtþ1φtþ2⋯
¼ Btþ ∑
1
i ¼ 1
Btþ i ∏
i
j ¼ 1
φtþ j1: ðA31Þ
Substituting back φt ¼ βtþ1=ð1αtÞ into Eq. (A31) implies
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ Btþ ∑
1
i ¼ 1
Btþ i ∏
i
j ¼ 1
βtþ j
1αtþ j1
: ðA32Þ
Substituting Eq. (A32) into Eq. (18) implies Eq. (31).
Proof. of Proposition 2’
Given Assumption A, Eq. (A32) reduces to the geometric series
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼ Nγt
1α α
dαþβ
dβ
1þr
" #
∑
1
i ¼ 0
β
ð1αÞð1þrÞ
 i
¼Nγt
αdαþðβdβÞ=ð1þrÞ
1αβ=ð1þrÞ ; ðA33Þ
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definitions for ρ and ρd imply further that
∂ℒ
∂ct
¼Nγt
ρdρ
1ρ ; ðA34Þ
which substituted into Eq. (18) implies Eq. (32).
Proof. of Proposition 3’
That the joint impact of present and future positionality effects increases the contribution to the public good in period t
means that the benefit side is amplified by such effects compared with the optimal provision rule without such concerns,
i.e., that
∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;G
1ρd
1ρ þΩtþ τ
 
½1ξτ4 ∑
1
τ ¼ 0
γtþ τ
γt
MBtþ τ;GþΩtþ τ
 ½1ξτ;
which is clearly true if and only if ρρd40, for which a sufficient condition (remember that ρ40) is that ρdo0.
Proof. of Proposition 4’
If leisure is weakly separable from private and public consumption as specified for all t, and where the sub-utility
function htðUÞ is the same for both ability types, then clearly MR^S2;tG;c ¼MRS1;tG;c and MR^S2;tG;x ¼MRS1;tG;x, implying that Ωt ¼ 0.
Moreover, all positionality degrees will be the same for the mimicker and the low-ability type, implying that α^2;ct ¼ α1;ct ,
α^2;xt ¼ α1;xt , β^
2;c
t ¼ β1;ct , and β^
2;x
t ¼ β1;xt for all t, and that αd ¼ βd ¼ 0. Substituting αd ¼ 0, βd ¼ 0, and Ωt ¼ 0 for all t into Eq. (32)
implies Eq. (33).
Proof. of Proposition 5’
Combining MRSi;tG;c ¼ ½vit;c=uit;cCMRSi;tG;c with uit;c ¼ vit;cþvit;Δct þv
i
t;δct
implies
MRSi;tG;c ¼
vit;c
vit;cþvit;Δct þv
i
t;δct
CMRSi;tG;c ¼ ð1αi;ct βi;ct ÞCMRSi;tG;c: ðA35Þ
Similarly, when old we have
MRSi;tG;x ¼ ð1αi;xt βi;xt ÞCMRSi;tG;x: ðA36Þ
Substituting Eqs. (A35) and (A36) into Eq. (16) implies
MBt;G ¼∑
i
nitð1αi;ct βi;xt ÞCMRSi;tG;cþ∑
i
nit1ð1αi;xt βi;xt ÞCMRSi;tG;x
¼ ð1αtβtÞCMBt;G 1þcov
1αtβt
1αtβt
;
CMRStG;c
CMRStG;c
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
¼ ð1αtβtÞCMBt;G½1þΛt ; ðA37Þ
where we have used the previously defined Λt . Substituting Eq. (A37) into Eq. (33) implies Eq. (34).
Proofs. of Proposition 6’ and Corollary 2’
Equivalent to the proofs of Proposition 6 and Corollary 2.References
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